

**B. Tasks:**

1. To impress on Nasser and Ben-Gurion the President's serious concern over the Near East arms race and the inherent risks if it escalates to nuclear levels.

2. To probe the motivations and ways to establish a simple and unobtrusive arrangement which would (a) ensure both the UAR and Israel that unconventional armaments (principally nuclear and offensive missiles) are being eschewed, and (b) would not entail interference with forces necessary for national security or programs for peaceful research in atomic energy or outer space.

3. To establish a basis for continuing a secret dialogue on the problem.

**C. Topics to be Discussed:**

1. Introducing the subject to Nasser (Tab A).

2. Introducing the subject to Ben-Gurion (Tab B).

3. Our general estimate of the UAR and Israel's advanced weapons programs (Tab C).

4. Possible arms limitation or control arrangements, both public and private, with attendant verification arrangements required for such schemes (Tab D—ACDA papers) which might be supplemented by (1) a more explicit assurance by the U.S. of the integrity of Israel and the Arab countries and (2) possible assistance for certain independent detection capabilities (Tab E). Primary emphasis will be on nuclear weapons and offensive missiles (Tab F—Range of Approach) but the discussion could also cover other areas such as bacteriological and chemical warfare weapons which are not considered to be a major threat (Tab G—Scientific Evaluation: Chemical, Biological, Radiological Weapons in the Near East).

5. Possible cooperative programs with the U.S. in the fields of atomic energy and outer space as a means of verification.

6. Suggestions on how Nasser might deal with Arab public opinion, if an arrangement on arms limitation were to become public (Tab I).

7. Press guidance in case of a leak (Tab J).

8. The next steps which might follow an initial approach. (Identifying a local point of contact.)

9. The need to keep the approach secret.

**D. Tactics:**

1. While indicating our desire to be flexible, suggest that the key for controlled armaments is a quiet competent third party for the negotiation and implementing phases and stress the services which the U.S. can provide.

2. Indicate that no formal agreement is expected between the UAR and Israel; however, U.S. bilateral arrangements with each party would